Here is a video I was sent today on an incident in the Pyrenees which occurred February 7th this year. The conditions were rated as risk level 2. The video contains some analysis on what happened and is well put together. The footage is pretty dramatic and I think it's definitely well worth a watch, so I wanted to share:
@drakesnow, pretty dramatic!
interesting to see how the skier triggered the big slide when skiing in the other guys tracks. Guess he punched through to the weak layer?
Well, the person's real but it's just a made up name, see?
Well, the person's real but it's just a made up name, see?
Scary. How come the guy filming from up on the ridge didn't go to help?
Just watched this. Scary how the minutes ticked away, even on the refined search in the last couple of meters.
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Then you can post your own questions or snow reports...
Yes it is, and it would have been the additional load that he caused.
Regarding the guide who filmed this, I assume he had clients with him...and he was actually the person who called the rescue services as it seems the guys on the ground did not have signal.
After all it is free
After all it is free
I was with the guide and saw this. Yes he did call the rescue services. I am on my mobile and will add more later.
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@Steilhang, Bruce Tremper's "never go first" did not work this time. But it does make sense that a skier can trigger a weak layer that is deeper than the snowboarder. More pressure, felt deeper into the snowpack
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@drakesnow, Cheers, was about to post the same.
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snowHeads are a friendly bunch.
Engelberg wrote:
@Steilhang, Bruce Tremper's "never go first" did not work this time. But it does make sense that a skier can trigger a weak layer that is deeper than the snowboarder. More pressure, felt deeper into the snowpack
I've seen this in a couple of videos now. One famous one somewhere in France where a whole group skied a slope and came to rest at a 'safe' spot. One of the last guys to go skied in the tracks of one of the others and the whole slope released. The safe spot turned out not to be safe after all! The theory is that the first guy doesn't quite get down to break the weak layer, but the second one in that track does. Sees to be some truth to this.
And love to help out and answer questions and of course, read each other's snow reports.
And love to help out and answer questions and of course, read each other's snow reports.
Engelberg wrote:
But it does make sense that a skier can trigger a weak layer that is deeper than the snowboarder. More pressure, felt deeper into the snowpack
I wonder if the slightly different line he took put him on thinner snowpack which triggered the weak layer. The fracture line doesn't look deep, and it almost looks like he falls as a result of running onto rocks under his skis. When I first saw the clip I thought he was performing a ski cut...
So if you're just off somewhere snowy come back and post a snow report of your own and we'll all love you very much
So if you're just off somewhere snowy come back and post a snow report of your own and we'll all love you very much
"The group triggered the avalanche near a shallow, rocky outcrop. It likely broke on a buried layer of near-surface facets that developed between storms during the first few days of the year. "
You know it makes sense.
You know it makes sense.
Steilhang wrote:
I've seen this in a couple of videos now. One famous one somewhere in France where a whole group skied a slope and came to rest at a 'safe' spot. One of the last guys to go skied in the tracks of one of the others and the whole slope released.
Foglietta in St Foy, a "guided" group but more recently there was an avalanche on the Bellevarde in Val d'Isere at the start of the season where the whole slope was tracked out before it slid.
When it comes to avalanches there are very few rules; there are just too many variables; that's why experienced skiers with a whole bag of rules and lore get caught so often (well that and they ski a lot). The difference between why one skier triggers a slope and one doesn't may be a matter of weight, ski style, skis even... as was said above with the difference between borders and skiers.
In the case of the video I agree that it is possibly the fact he skied higher up where the snow is thinner (due to the effects of wind) that probably meant he was able to trigger the weak layer below.
The final search wasn't brilliant in the video. Once you are down to the last 2 meters you need to be on your hands and knees with the beacon just above the snowpack and always in the same orientation. (note one of the skiers had just dug himself out of the slide !)
They got their friend out, that's the main thing.
Last edited by You know it makes sense. on Wed 27-02-19 20:56; edited 1 time in total
Otherwise you'll just go on seeing the one name:
Otherwise you'll just go on seeing the one name:
I said earlier that I witnessed this, so here is my recollection of what happened. Any timings I give are the Youtube ones at the bottom left of the screen, not the others that appear on the screen.
We were on a Snoworks trip staying in Bacquera in the Spanish Pyrenees. We had two Snoworks instructors Lee Townend and Nick Quinn, together with local Spanish guide, or I think I should maybe say Catalan guide, Roger Martorell. A number of us also skied with Roger a year earlier and he is absolutely superb. It is Lee’s voice you hear shouting “avalanche” at 2:35 and also later when the helicopter arrived.
We were in three groups totalling I think sixteen clients. When the video text says “Roger and Lee” at 0:41, that is the point to which they climbed up and watched the rescue. We were all a bit lower down initially when we saw the avalanche. If you move the video on to 0:46 you will see a small col lower and to the right. I think that is where we were taking skins off after skinning up. Our route down was beyond there and not visible. I hasten to add it was much gentler in pitch and a completely different aspect.
After arriving at the col, we spotted the two boarders and skier away in the distance and were at once impressed although also wondering if that was a good place to be. Lee’s camera shots make it look a lot closer. That must have been a very good lens. We watched the two boarders swoop into the couloir closer to the camera. Their descent looked even more impressive from our angle than it appears on the headcams. Lee decided to film the skier just to get some good footage I think and as he did so the avalanche was triggered. In fact he just missed the actual trigger moment and picks it up a second or so later. If you quickly stop start the video at 2:37, in the lower half of the shot nearest the camera, you should be able to see an upside down ski with a bit of a leg attached. That is the skier.
Roger immediately called the rescue service and then scrambled up to the viewpoint I mentioned earlier followed shortly by Lee. All of us clients together with Nick remained at the col although Nick was in radio contact with the Lee and Roger. From where we were as clients, we could see nothing further of what was going on.
At 4:02 the text implies that the first call to the rescue service stated that one person was buried, one half buried and the third was searching. That cannot be correct because all any of us saw was what you see in Lee’s camera shot. The lower half or more of the avalanche was not visible. Roger must have made a second call I am guessing about five minutes later once he had scrambled up to the ridge and could see the outcome.
To answer an earlier question, there was no way anyone could have gone down to help. The victims are about a thousand feet lower down a very nasty slope. The reason the footage of the rescue is somewhat shaky is because it was filmed from so far above.
We could hear Roger trying to shout down to the victims although we could not hear what he was saying. If you follow the video through you will see that the victims could not get a phone signal, however unbeknown to them, Roger had already been in touch with the rescue services. I suspect that was what he was trying to convey to the victims.
Now here is my unwitting part in the rescue.
In skinning up I had trouble with the last uphill kick turn and ended up falling off the skinning track. I was in no danger but was in an awkward position. Nick came back down to help. He carried my skis whilst I boot packed the last stretch up. When I got to the top I felt somewhat embarrassed for delaying the group for about fifteen or twenty minutes, although everybody was very supportive.
If I had not caused that delay however we would almost certainly have moved off before the avalanche happened. By the time the rescue service arrived the video says that the buried victim already had second degree hypothermia. We also know that he suffered trauma to his chest and legs.
This group was lucky in a number of ways:
The skier went 380 metres vertically including going over rocky drop offs but was completely uninjured and able to search for his buried friend.
Because of my misadventures we happened to be in the right place at the right time.
Because the accident was witnessed by our local guide the rescue service were given a precise location of where the accident happened.
It was an interesting day.
Poster: A snowHead
Poster: A snowHead
Thanks for the extra info. I've just watched the end section. Really good effort from the mountain guide to provide something useful and informative.
Obviously A snowHead isn't a real person
Obviously A snowHead isn't a real person
Vid is a good example of analysis done on here a while back.
Never ride offpiste on North or East slopes after midday.
The hot Euro sun melts the snow and off it slides.
Follow that advice and it reduces the avvy risk by 50-80%.
Vid says it was an East slope in the afternoon.
Well, the person's real but it's just a made up name, see?
Well, the person's real but it's just a made up name, see?
When it comes to avalanches there are very few rules; there are just too many variables; that's why experienced skiers with a whole bag of rules and lore get caught so often (well that and they ski a lot). ..
Maybe I misunderstood, but if you are saying that staying alive in avalanche terrain is only due to luck, and that there are no ways to significantly reduce the risk, that is very wrong. Risk can never be reduced to zero, but education, experience, adhering to rules, do make us much safer.
Anyway, snowHeads is much more fun if you do.
Anyway, snowHeads is much more fun if you do.
@Engelberg, I'm increasingly thinking of this as a bit like walking through a mine field. With good tactics and strategy you can avoid stepping on something and triggering a nasty, but eventually you might be unlucky.
Choice of ground and line can minumise the consequences and exposure to risk but if you want to ski steeper lines I fear being lucky (or more to the point, unlucky) is a factor.
Thinking while typing, maybe in the future drones and snow penetrating radar will allow skiers to map slopes and id thin snowpack issues.
Never ride offpiste on North or East slopes after midday.
The hot Euro sun melts the snow and off it slides.
Follow that advice and it reduces the avvy risk by 50-80%.
Vid says it was an East slope in the afternoon.
cowdoo and a total generalisation. The amount of misinformation you spout on here never fails to amaze.
Back on topic - great video and very powerful.
Then you can post your own questions or snow reports...
Then you can post your own questions or snow reports...
Engelberg wrote:
davidof wrote:
When it comes to avalanches there are very few rules; there are just too many variables; that's why experienced skiers with a whole bag of rules and lore get caught so often (well that and they ski a lot). ..
Maybe I misunderstood, but if you are saying that staying alive in avalanche terrain is only due to luck, and that there are no ways to significantly reduce the risk, that is very wrong. Risk can never be reduced to zero, but education, experience, adhering to rules, do make us much safer.
That's not quite the case. You can dramatically reduce the risk by staying on slopes of less than 30degrees and by understanding the condition of the snow pack. In the video, we see that the slope was 35 degrees and it was sitting on a rotten layer of deep hoar. A slide was almost inevitable and the slide at the top was enough to cause the more stable terrain lower down (over the rocks) to go as well.
The video was good, if somewhat scary to watch. Very interesting that one guy lost his rucksack in the slide and so lucky that the second burial popped half out of the snow at the end.
The chap in the analysis says they were winging it, without even knowing the risk on that day. Glad they all survived it.
After all it is free
After all it is free
@bar shaker, that is why the rucksacks have chest straps (a lot of people don't bother) and even more importantly groin straps (which even less people bother with).
Aftermarket groin straps are easy to source if your rucksack does not have one.
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@bar shaker, as I understood it he didn't lose the rucksack, but rather it got shredded on the way down and he lost his shovel and probe. Probably means he was scraped over rocks, so the rucksack saved him from injury.
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rungsp wrote:
.. that is why the rucksacks have chest straps (a lot of people don't bother) and even more importantly groin straps (which even less people bother with).
Aftermarket groin straps are easy to source if your rucksack does not have one.
Not talking about this video, but on that specific point, I'm constantly amused by the large number of people I see with airbags who chop the leg straps off them.
It's odd that you'd think to use something like that without apparently thinking at all about how it must work.
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snowHeads are a friendly bunch.
Whitegold wrote:
Vid is a good example of analysis done on here a while back.
Never ride offpiste on North or East slopes after midday.
The hot Euro sun melts the snow and off it slides.
Follow that advice and it reduces the avvy risk by 50-80%.
Vid says it was an East slope in the afternoon.
I have seen you trot this out a few times now, which I view as a good example of a little knowledge being a dangerous thing. The aspect is indeed ONE element of a risk assessment but there are many others that may be more significant. I make it a point to never ski with anyone who states or relies on rules of thumb such as this as it demonstrates a compete lack of understanding of decision making dynamics. Such broad assumptions introduce conscious or unconscious bias into the decision making process, and increase the risk that options are dismissed/not properly considered. In your case it could lead to avoiding a north or east facing slope when it would in fact be the safer option. Any member of a group, experienced or otherwise, must avoid making assumptions and always be able to properly examine all available information and options. In fact there is quite a lot of evidence that groups that include a mix of experience and ability are safer as the less knowledgeable make less assumptions, assuming of course that the leader is sophisticated enough to ensure all member of the group speak up and are listened to equally. I suspect you do not understand any of that, especially the leadership element, so you should not be directing others in any way particularly as you present your advice as coming from an expert which you clearly are not.
And love to help out and answer questions and of course, read each other's snow reports.
And love to help out and answer questions and of course, read each other's snow reports.
Steilhang wrote:
@bar shaker, as I understood it he didn't lose the rucksack, but rather it got shredded on the way down and he lost his shovel and probe. Probably means he was scraped over rocks, so the rucksack saved him from injury.
That makes more sense. Thanks for clarifying.
So if you're just off somewhere snowy come back and post a snow report of your own and we'll all love you very much
So if you're just off somewhere snowy come back and post a snow report of your own and we'll all love you very much
Whitegold wrote:
Vid is a good example of analysis done on here a while back.
Never ride offpiste on North or East slopes after midday.
The hot Euro sun melts the snow and off it slides.
Follow that advice and it reduces the avvy risk by 50-80%.
Vid says it was an East slope in the afternoon.
Why "North & East" instead of "South and East" ?
North facing slopes don't receive much sun, south and east do.
You know it makes sense.
You know it makes sense.
I thought I might add a bit more about the conditions that day. The OP says that the accident happened on the 7th whereas in fact if you look at the beginning of the video it says it was 6th which is as I remember it.
We arrived on Sunday 3rd. There was fresh snow when we arrived and on the Monday we had a great blue sky powder day. We knew however that it was going to get seriously warm and so it did. The Tuesday was a whiteout day and it was drizzling with rain when we got back to the village. There was a huge detrimental effect on the off piste conditions.
When we set off on Wednesday we were told that there was a possibility that we might not be able to go off piste at all let alone do our planned expedition. I am surprised if the avalanche safety level was only 2 as stated in the OP. I would say it must have been at least level 3.
If you go to the video at 0:46 you will hear one of the group say that it was super good but a bit crusty. If you move on to the boarder going down at 1:12 the video together with the sound gives you an idea of what it was like. It was somewhat like spring snow in some ways rather than fresh powder. Our conditions were similar but as I said before we were on much shallower terrain. It was quite a long descent that we did followed by another skinning session before a further descent. The overall conditions off piste were much the same everywhere and we saw a smaller slide later. It was certainly a day for extreme caution in my view.
I think that is why so many of us were so surprised to see those three people in the place that they were at the beginning and although it was horrifying to watch the avalanche, I don’t think it came as a total surprise.
Otherwise you'll just go on seeing the one name:
Otherwise you'll just go on seeing the one name:
Curious to know how you feel after the whole event. The movie is quite superb and a great learning tool.
Roger must have put much effort into collecting the various footage and then doing the interview.
The best part of all is nobody was seriously hurt or worse! (My question addressed to richjp)
Poster: A snowHead
Poster: A snowHead
Thanks.
So referring back up the thread, it may be "a minefield", but in this case some people decided not to wander around in it on this particular day. Including the guy with the distance camera, who was probably on a different aspect for a reason.
People do whine about having to ride on mellow terrain in high risk conditions.
I'd say that's where the minefield is, in that you'll get away with strolling through there almost always.
Obviously A snowHead isn't a real person
Obviously A snowHead isn't a real person
Rogerdodger wrote:
Curious to know how you feel after the whole event. The movie is quite superb and a great learning tool.
Roger must have put much effort into collecting the various footage and then doing the interview.
The best part of all is nobody was seriously hurt or worse! (My question addressed to richjp)
Words like sobering and chastening come to mind.
I have been skiing off piste for forty years and had to get out of the way myself around five years ago to avoid a slow moving avalanche although the danger was only momentary. I have seen smaller non threatening avalanches a number of times. Like many no doubt I have also seen plenty of Youtube videos where people have been caught in big slides like this one, in fact Nick Quinn of Snoworks gave a lecture in the hotel on one of the first two nights of the week including a video of yet another major incident.
Despite that background, to witness something like that live with the whole side of the mountain giving way was for me completely different. The video is not all in real time. We could not see the helicopter arrive as it was the other side of the ridge, however Roger said that it took half an hour. I don’t think that is an indictment against the rescue service, but illustrates the fact that you cannot expect a helicopter to be standing by all the time. They were possibly engaged elsewhere. I think that illustrates the fact that you must be primarily dependent on your own group for rescue.
It must have been forty minutes or more before Roger returned to our group. The guides then asked if anybody wanted to turn back in case they had felt traumatised by what happened, which I think was the right question to ask. We all did in fact continue however I think I might have felt differently if the rescue had turned out for the worse.
It certainly has not deterred me in fact I am off tomorrow for a week with Freshtracks. I am not a professional but from what I saw of the conditions that day, I think they were taking a huge risk. As has been mentioned by others you can never cover all the risks but for me this accident was avoidable.
Well, the person's real but it's just a made up name, see?
Well, the person's real but it's just a made up name, see?
Thank you for posting this video and @richjp for your commentary.
As has been mentioned by others you can never cover all the risks but for me this accident was avoidable.
I haven't got the exact figures at my fingertips but I can look them out; some things to ponder
1. the majority of avalanche victims (caught, injured, killed) are experienced skiers either with years of off-piste or touring and/or with formal education. We are talking figures of around 70%. A surprising number of professionals involved although Switzerland has a better record in this respect than say France or Austria.
2. In most incidents there are at least 2, and frequently 3 signs that the slope is potentially dangerous, these are either missed or ignored by the victims. When you look at incident reports you frequently wonder why they were skiing where they were.
3. Getting killed by an avalanche is pretty unlikely, clueless or educated. We've probably all skied over slabs primed to trigger but somehow we were lucky that day. I skied the west face of the Arclusaz in the Bauges at the start of February, a big, open, 35-40 degree snow covered face, I was pretty cautious about it but it all seemed stable. I passed by last week and the whole face had slid. When, why? I don't know. Of course I could attribute the fact it didn't slide when I skied it to my superior decision making but it could just be luck. I've been exceptionally lucky over the years.
So what do I conclude from my own experience.
i. Some educated skiers are pushing the envelope (think cases like Steve Romeo from TetonAt as a typical example). They are not using their education to eliminate but to qualify routes. A typical case was a slide near me this year. Avalanche risk 2 and principally on east faces for the day - the guy who was caught considered he was on a North-East face so safe - but the NE aspect only applied to a short couloir. He was also unlucky. Clueless skiers tend to be more conservative, they know nothing and if they actually realize they know nothing they tend to keep off avalanche prone terrain or hire a guide (but see point 1).
ii. Educated skiers who are applying their knowledge to make intelligent choices to ski avalanche prone routes (anything over 30 degrees) have to get it right nearly all the time or they soon have the same chance of getting caught as clueless skiers.
iii. It is very difficult to apply all the information on the ground and then a lot of it are probabilities (north aspects, slope angle, altitude, season, time of day). The only reasonably sure thing is that for skier triggered slab avalanches part of the slope needs to be in the 30 degree plus range plus but even then, you ski what appears to be a <30 degree slope, see some nice line on the descent, ski over a roll over on some excellent powder that is 31 degrees and pow, you trigger a slab and get buried in a terrain trap. You have to be conservative because if you start making too many marginal calls you are going to get caught out.
Yup we know professionals and experienced skiers spend more time in the mountains. I feel for guides who have to find stuff to ski even when the conditions are complicated. Think the 2 Alpes incident in January. The guide was on what should have been on a safer slope aspect (south) but at the start altitude and topography there was a risk of windslab and that's what caught him and his client.
To sum up: Be humble, hubris will kill you otherwise.
Anyway, snowHeads is much more fun if you do.
Anyway, snowHeads is much more fun if you do.
@davidof, Thanks. Did you get around to writing up your annual review for last winter ? Always educational.
Vid is a good example of analysis done on here a while back.
Never ride offpiste on North or East slopes after midday.
The hot Euro sun melts the snow and off it slides.
Follow that advice and it reduces the avvy risk by 50-80%.
Vid says it was an East slope in the afternoon.
I have seen you trot this out a few times now, which I view as a good example of a little knowledge being a dangerous thing. The aspect is indeed ONE element of a risk assessment but there are many others that may be more significant. I make it a point to never ski with anyone who states or relies on rules of thumb such as this as it demonstrates a compete lack of understanding of decision making dynamics. Such broad assumptions introduce conscious or unconscious bias into the decision making process, and increase the risk that options are dismissed/not properly considered. In your case it could lead to avoiding a north or east facing slope when it would in fact be the safer option. Any member of a group, experienced or otherwise, must avoid making assumptions and always be able to properly examine all available information and options. In fact there is quite a lot of evidence that groups that include a mix of experience and ability are safer as the less knowledgeable make less assumptions, assuming of course that the leader is sophisticated enough to ensure all member of the group speak up and are listened to equally. I suspect you do not understand any of that, especially the leadership element, so you should not be directing others in any way particularly as you present your advice as coming from an expert which you clearly are not.
The ski industry is littered with cod-science and pseudointellectuals claiming all kinds of cleverlooking theories on snow crystals, wind, etc.
But dozens of folks still get killed every year.
Most slides (involving skiers) in the European Alps happen on East- and North-facing slopes above 2000m in the afternoon when the avalanche-risk is rated around 3.
Follow those simple rules and everyone will be a lot safer.
Then you can post your own questions or snow reports...
Then you can post your own questions or snow reports...
AndAnotherThing.. wrote:
@davidof, Thanks. Did you get around to writing up your annual review for last winter ? Always educational.
No but now the weather is turning unsettled I may well do it !
For France there were a lot of avalanche fatalities last season (compared with this season to date). 37 in total. But that is not many compared to the amount of skier / days in total both touring and off piste.
Principal issues last season :
i) lone skiers / or skiers too close together so lack of witnesses delaying rescue. This is a particular issue for ski tourers who group up climbing
ii) bad weather was a big factor last year - poor visibility complicates everything, you are not going to get a heli search and rescue in dense cloud
iii) trauma - taken over cliffs or hitting objects in the slide
iv) equipment: no beacon, faulty airbag usage
in the case of no beacon incidents there is some controversy. One skier appears to have been on an open piste. At Cauterets a group of three skiers were caught and killed but it appears they were lost and the pistes were poorly indicated - there is a court case between the families and resort. Ditto at Val d'Isere where a father and daughter were killed, the mother claims the piste wasn't indicated as closed, again there is an ongoing court case. Anyone who has skied a lot know these kind of things can happen.
You have both to ask youself i) is this slope likely to slide and ii) if it slides, what are the consequences
Our conditions were similar but as I said before we were on much shallower terrain
for good reason, even if this had not slid.
Which is why I think this type of risk is particularly hard for people to manage. With hindsight, they made lots of mistakes, but if they'd got away with it,
they'd have learned... that those things were not mistakes. As it is the result was maybe the best possible - they will probably not make the same error again.
The skier triggers the slide pretty much immediately he sets off. He didn't expect it because he almost makes a turn in the wrong direction, and
appears to miss a chance to escape at that point. Sending a skier to "ski cut" may have been an idea.
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@Whitegold, Do you have any self awareness at all?
"The ski industry is littered with cod-science and pseudointellectuals..." you say, then repeat your own psuedo-science. Please stop. You have no idea what you are talking about. Your advice is both dangerous (as I have already pointed out) and unfounded.
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Clearly there are many different factors to consider, but I am not sure that this is "pseudo-science". The Schweizer & Jamieson paper from 2000 indicated that around 70% of skier-triggered avalanches in the Alps are on north and east facing slopes, and at altitudes above 2000m.
Given that many off-piste skiers don't have (enough) expertise in assessing avalanche risk, and equally are not that likely to acquire it, some simple knowledge / guidance like this is probably better than nothing.
(Admittedly there could be some selection bias in the data used in the paper, e.g. if 70% of all off-piste skiing is on north and east facing slopes it might be less remarkable).
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for good reason, even if this had not slid.
